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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents some of the results of a study that aims to investigate how mental states 
can be conveyed linguistically in texts of a personal nature. Figurative language, in particular 
metaphor and metonymy, are generally understood to play an important role in the 
expression of such complex phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Kövecses, 2000; Meier and 
Robinson, 2005). The study therefore looks at the metaphors used to convey mental states in 
the Smith Journal of ‘The Unabridged Journals of Sylvia Plath’. Mental state here refers to 
various aspects of cognitive functioning, but the focus, in particular, is on mental states of 
affect i.e. those mental states that are intrinsically valenced (Ortony and Turner, 1990). Sylvia 
Plath’s journal provides particularly rich data due to the writer’s linguistic creativity and 
documented mental health issues, the experience of which she continually explores. 
Specifically then, this paper focuses on metaphors of motion (or lack thereof) and so called 
split self metaphors. 
Both manual intensive analysis and automated corpus methodologies are employed in the 
investigation: the Wmatrix corpus tool (Rayson, 2009) is used to identify semantic fields that 
are potential source and target domains in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of 
metaphor use. In depth analysis is then conducted manually on a sample of journal entries. 
The MIP procedure (Pragglejaz, 2007) is used for metaphor identification, and interpretations 
draw on research in other fields, especially psychology, on representations of affect. 
Metaphors of mental state are analyzed in terms of their implications for conveying a sense of 
intensity, valency and creativity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I am afraid I am not solid, but hollow. I feel behind my eyes a numb, paralyzed 
cavern, a pit of hell, a mimicking nothingness (Entry 154). 
Certain sections of Sylvia Plath’s journals are riddled with sentences like the one above. The 
phenomenological experience of highly subjective phenomena such as emotions, perceptions, 
sensations are difficult to describe using language. The most common way of doing so is by 
using metaphors. Ortony (1975) suggests that metaphors are necessary for communication 
because of the distinction between the discreteness of language as a set of symbols and the 
continuity/fluidity of experience which is what needs to be conveyed. Metaphors are 
necessary because they can compactly and efficiently convey a lot of information very vividly – 
information that is inexpressible literally. As a result even in psychology it is recognized that 
‘people often do not convey how they feel through plain emotion words, but rather through 
metaphor’ (Junghaenel et al., 2008: 51). This paper explores some of the ways in which 
metaphorical expressions can convey the experience of such highly subjective phenomena, 
collectively termed mental states. 
The Unabridged Journals of Sylvia Plath (Kukil, 2000) is an interesting text for two reasons. 
Firstly, the diary as a genre is particularly appropriate for an investigation of the linguistic 
manifestation of mental states, since they are by nature concerned with the self, and the self's 
private thoughts and emotions. Additionally, it is well-documented that Plath suffered from 
depression for most of her life (e.g. Brian, 2001; Cooper, 2003) and that she tried to commit 
suicide at least twice. She writes about these experiences in her diaries. Secondly, Plath’s diary 
can be seen as an especially rich source of metaphorical language due to her budding talents 
as a writer and poet. For these reasons, it was assumed that her journals are fruitful grounds 
for the investigation of metaphors of mental states. 
The focus of this paper is the first journal published in the collection (henceforth Smith 
Journal), as it has internal coherence and can be seen as a comprehensive representation of 
the time it covers. It begins in 1950, at the time Plath leaves home to go to university and ends 
just before her first suicide attempt in August 1953.  
This paper aims to present a small part of the results of a larger investigation into the kinds of 
metaphorical expressions (representative of the selfi or mental states) that are present in the 
Smith Journal. In particular it will focus on metaphors of motion (or lack thereof) and 
metaphors of a ‘split self’ (in a broad sense). The way in which metaphorical expressions and 
their patterning can convey various aspects of mental states (such as valency, intensity, control 
etc.) will also be touched upon briefly. In the process, some comments will be made on some 
of the methodological issues encountered during the investigation and the theoretical notions 
that were useful in circumventing them. 
This investigation makes use of both manual intensive analysis and automated corpus 
approaches. Corpus tools (the Wmatrix software of Rayson, 2009) are used to examine the 
complete Smith Journal and highlight semantic fields that potentially carry relevant 
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metaphorical content. In addition, Wmatrix is also used to explore in detail the key terms and 
semantic domains identified in the manual analysis. The manual intensive approach aims to 
provide an in-depth analysis of the way metaphors pattern, combine and interact in a sample 
of 18 entries in the Smith Journal. 
After discussing some key terminology, this paper will look at a preliminary extended example 
from the data to illustrate some of its overall characteristics. It will briefly touch upon some of 
the theoretical frameworks that can be useful in dealing with texts of this nature. The paper 
will then examine two groups of metaphors in more detail: motion metaphors and split self 
metaphors. A final section will briefly consider the wider implications of these findings. 
1.1. KEY NOTIONS  
At this stage it is necessary to clarify the approach and some of the key terminology that this 
paper will adopt. ‘Mental state’, for instance, is notoriously difficult to define. However, for the 
purposes of this paper it is to be understood as various aspects of cognitive functioning (e.g. 
making decisions, thinking, remembering etc.), but the focus, in particular, will be on mental 
states of affect i.e. those mental states that are intrinsically valenced (Ortony and Turner, 
1990) i.e. are either positive or negative in their experience. 
The approach to metaphor that this paper takes is based on Lakoff and Johnson’s (1982) 
conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and accepts (with some reservations) that systematic 
linguistic patterns are representative of patterns of thought. The linguistic metaphors 
identified will be grouped into quasi-conceptual metaphors. However, although this is a CMT-
style analysis, the homogeneity of the data requires that any patterns are seen as systematic 
metaphors (Cameron, 2008) rather than conceptual ones. According to Cameron (2008) 
systematic metaphor can be seen as a discourse alternative to conceptual metaphor and 
allows the researcher to remain relatively close to the linguistic examples in the description of 
patterns. 
Metaphor itself will be defined as an instance of language use where the contextual meaning 
of a word or phrase is different from and to be understood in comparison to the basic meaning 
of the same word or phrase (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). For example, in the sentence For years, 
Sonia Gandhi has struggled to convince Indians that she is fit to wear the mantle of the political 
dynasty into which she married, let alone to become premier there are several metaphorically 
used lexical items. Focusing on mantle, the Pragglejaz Group (2007) explains that it is 
metaphorical because in context it ‘refers to the role that the Ghandi [sic] family has played in 
the political leadership of India’ (2007:9). The basic sense however would be in reference to a 
piece of outer clothing usually worn as a symbol of power. These two meanings are different, 
but they can be understood in comparison with one another: ‘We can understand the role of 
political leadership that someone may take on in a democracy after other members of their 
family in terms of the garment that is traditionally worn by a monarch’ (ibid.). 
Metaphor identification, then, is based on MIP (Pragglejaz Group, 2007) and makes the 
following coding decision: firstly, one lexical unit of metaphor is to be understood as one word 
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or multi-word unit (e.g. auxiliary + main verb, personal names, phrasal verbs, fixed collocations 
and idioms). Secondly, the focus is only on lexical words rather than function words, but 
prepositional adverbs, such as up, down, back, forward are also considered. Finally, 
delexicalized/grammaticalized words such as have, do, give, take, make, get, put, like (Deignan 
2005) are excluded. The basic meanings are identified with the help of the online version of 
the Oxford English Dictionary (https://www.oed.com). 
Some of these decisions reflect an interest in the more unusual metaphorical expressions. I am 
using unusual purposefully in order to avoid the more common and theoretically loaded terms 
of (un)conventional, novel and creative. The interest in more unusual metaphorical expressions 
comes from the focus on metaphors of mental states. It is my assumption that highly 
conventional metaphorical expressions of mental states such I am in love reflect the way 
language functions more than they reflect the mental state of love, for example. On the other 
hand, more unusual metaphors may reflect the characteristics of the mental state more than 
the characteristic of the language. 
1.2. A PRELIMINARY EXAMPLE 
The nature of the data at hand is best introduced by means of an example. This example will 
be useful in illustrating some of the methodological issues that surfaced during the 
investigation and in briefly commenting on how metaphorical expressions can convey various 
aspects of mental states.  
Example 1 was written on 3rd November 1952 during Plath’s second year at Smith College. The 
entry shows frustration, despair and fear, and begins with a phrase that can be seen as a 
culmination of these feelings: God, if ever I have come close to wanting to commit suicide, it is 
now. There is little indication of cause of the negative mental state, but Plath alludes to the 
burden of duties, the uncertainty of the future and the unfulfilled need to talk to somebody. In 
the extended entry, Plath does eventually recognize that she is in fact privileged and has no 
rational reason for feeling the way she does. She decides to at least pretend to be happy. In 
the excerpt, the metaphorical expressions relating to mental states or the self are underlined. 
EXAMPLE 1 
i  
ii  
iii 
iv 
v 
vi 
vii  
I am afraid I am not solid, but hollow. I feel behind my eyes a numb, 
paralyzed cavern, a pit of hell, a mimicking nothingness. I never thought, I 
never wrote, I never suffered. I want to kill myself, to escape from 
responsibility, to crawl back abjectly into the womb. I do not know who I am, 
where I am going — and I am the one who has to decide the answers to 
these hideous questions. I long for a noble escape from freedom — I am 
weak, tired, in revolt from the strong constructive humanitarian faith which 
presupposes a healthy, active intellect and will. There is no where to go. 
(from Entry 154)  
In terms of metaphorical expressions, the first aspect to note is textual complexity. Take the 
notion of emptiness or hollowness for example: firstly, it is textually repeated (Semino, 2008) 
using the near synonyms not solid, hollow, cavern, pit, nothingness (these expressions can all 
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be subsumed under the broad source domain of EMPTY CONTAINER). The textual repetition can 
express increased intensity of a mental state. Secondly, the EMPTY CONTAINER metaphor is 
conceptually elaborated (Lakoff and Turner, 1989) as something that is localized behind the 
eyes; it is specified as hell and conceptually extended (Lakoff and Turner, 1989) as mimicking. 
An alternative way of looking at mimicking, is to think of it as an example of compounding 
(Goatly, 1997): a metaphorical expression (nothingness - an example of the BODY IS A CONTAINER 
METAPHOR - to refer to a mental state) is referred to metaphorically again by means of 
personification. More specifically, in this case there is a scenario in which THE BODY IS AN EMPTY 
CONTAINER and that EMPTY CONTAINER stands for the mental state. This is then also 
animated/personified with the ability to interact.  
Aside from textual repetition and conceptual elaboration, Example 1 also contains a textual 
cluster (Semino, 2008) of metaphors.  In lines i-ii for example, the source domains of EMPTINESS, 
RELIGION (hell), LACK OF SENSATION (numb, paralysed), and LACK OF MOTION metaphors (paralyzed) 
can all be found. The various source domains in the cluster interact to create a more 
comprehensive idea of the mental state and also help to express valency. For example, the 
source domains of HELL and PARALYSIS carry strong negative connotations that are transferred 
onto the target domain. Paralyzed can additionally be seen as an example of a nested 
metaphor (Charteris-Black and Musolff, 2003). ‘Nesting’ is the idea that one linguistic token 
can evoke more than one source domain. In the case of paralyzed, at least three source 
domains are evoked: the inability to move, a physical illness, and lack of sensation. 
It is also worth noting the interaction between the literal (albeit potentially hyperbolic) and 
metaphorical expressions as in line iii for example. First of all, I want to kill myself helps to 
specify the target domain for the subsequent metaphorical expressions (escape, crawl back, 
womb), which would otherwise have to be generically described as a ‘negative mental state’. 
Instead, in this case it can be described with some certainty as suicidality. It also helps in 
setting up a scenario that surrounding metaphorical expressions can be attracted into 
(Cameron and Low, 2004). For example, womb is not normally associated with anything 
negative (or a mental state for that matter), rather it is seen as nurturing, warm and a place of 
comfort. However, in the present scenario, it represents the consequence or end point of 
suicide. 
Example 1 also demonstrates how a variety of metaphors create complex scenarios (‘mini-
narratives’ – Musolff, 2006) of mental states. In the ‘scenario’ described above, initially the 
only human participant is Plath. However, her own mental state becomes a participant when it 
takes on the role of mimicking. In addition, Plath’s mental state is conceptualized as hell. This 
in itself could be seen as a mini-scenario involving sinners, torture, heat etc. which are mapped 
onto the target domain of the mental state. In this sense, although the various linguistic 
metaphors can be linked to different source domains, the way they are combined has its own 
coherence.  
As indicated by some of the references so far, there are a number of theoretical frameworks 
that are useful in accounting for the various types of complexity embedded in the data. 
Kövecses’ (2000) collection of conceptual metaphors of emotion, as well as Stefanowitsch’s 
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(2006) extension on those, can be used as a quasi comparative norm and an anchor for the 
systematic metaphors in the text. Additionally, Semino’s (2008) notions of textual patterning 
(in particular, repetition, recurrence, clustering, and (textual) extension) can account for 
creativity on the textual level; while Lakoff and Turner’s (1989) extension, elaboration, and 
combination, in particular, are useful in describing the creativity on the conceptual level. I 
would like to echo Semino (2010) in stating that both the conceptual and textual levels are 
necessary in adequately accounting for metaphorical patterns in any given text. 
2. METAPHORS OF MOTION (OR LACK THEREOF) 
The analysis of metaphorical expressions in Sylvia Plath’s journals produced a number of 
interesting potential patterns. For example, it appears that inner conflict (or negative mental 
states) tends to be expressed with a higher number of and more complex metaphorical 
expressions than positive ones. In addition, negative mental states are often conceptualized as 
physical states (e.g. as a physical illness) or as opponents (some of these will be discussed 
below). However, there are two particularly interesting patterns of systematic metaphors that 
I would like to focus on here. These are the conceptualizations of negative mental states as 
either stagnation, or movement in a direction that is undesirable (c.f. traditional life is a 
JOURNEY metaphor); and conceptualizations of negative mental states as a divisive inner conflict 
leading to split self metaphors. In the following examples, metaphorical expressions referring 
to mental states are underlined. The metaphorical expressions to focus on for each example 
are also in bold. 
Various metaphors of motion (or lack thereof) account for about 21% of the metaphorical 
expressions of mental states that were identified in the manual intensive analysis. Linguistic 
manifestations of the various subcategories of these motion metaphors can be seen in 
Example 2, Example 3 and Example 4. 
EXAMPLE 2 LACK OF MOVEMENT METAPHORSii 
i. to feel his mind soaring, reaching, and mine caged... (154) 
ii. don't ignore all the people you could know, shutting yourself up in a numb defensive 
vacuum (July 6) 
iii. Your room is not your prison. You are. (July 6) 
iv. look at the hell I am wallowing in, nerves paralyzed, action nullified (154) 
v. you are paralyzed, shocked, thrown into a nausea, a stasis. (July 6) 
Admittedly, some of the expressions in Example 2 (especially caged) are difficult to conceive of 
as motion metaphors. Perhaps a more accurate description would be to say that all these 
expressions involve the impossibility to move. However, motion metaphor is to be understood 
as an umbrella term here. The linguistic expressions in bold in Example 2, can be seen as 
different versions of the lack of movement metaphor that frequently occurs in the Smith 
Journal. Movement in this sense can be interpreted as part of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY METAPHOR, 
where progress in life is conceptualized as movement forward. In fact, this conceptual 
metaphor can be seen as an interpretational basis for all movement metaphors discussed 
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here. Lines i-iii in Example 2 could be grouped under a narrower source domain of EXTERNAL 
PHYSICAL RESTRICTION for example, that limits movement, such as a cage or a prison. The 
linguistic examples in these three lines, conceptualize the mental state as being a container 
that encompasses and limits the self (or the mind as in Example 2i). These could be interpreted 
as a subversion of Kövecses’ (2000) EMOTIONiii IS SOMETHING IN A CONTAINER. Instead of the mental 
state being something inside something else (usually the body), it is the container itself. 
Although this type of metaphor is not usually noted in the literature on metaphors of 
emotions, it has been noted in a slightly different form by McMullen and Conway (2002). They 
state that depression in particular is often conceptualized as a space that is difficult to get out 
of. What is also somewhat unusual in i and ii is that the external restriction is conceptualized 
as self-imposed. Most literature on depression and similar mental states notes that there is 
often a lack of agency on the part of the sufferer – they do not attribute responsibility to 
themselves for the way that they are feeling. Yet the linguistic examples here suggest some 
element of acknowledged responsibility. 
Lines iv and v in Example 2 are also examples of the LACK OF MOVEMENT source domain. 
However, in these cases the restriction is an internal physical one. Although, as noted in the 
discussion of the preliminary example, paralysis is an example of a nested metaphor and can 
carry the meanings of more than one source domain, in this case, the meaning of lack of 
motion seems to dominate. This is probably due its attraction into the lack of motion scenario 
by the repetition of similar expressions that do not have multiple meanings (e.g. action 
nullified, stasis). In the context of the other lack of movement metaphors, what I find 
particularly interesting about the idea of a physical inability to move is that it seems even more 
difficult to overcome than an externally imposed restriction. In this sense, McMullen and 
Conway’s (2002) comment about the difficulty of overcoming depression as expressed in 
spatial metaphors seems particularly appropriate.  
Aside from metaphors that suggest a complete lack of movement, there are examples of 
motion metaphors where although there is movement, it is not of the productive kind.  
EXAMPLE 3 UNPRODUCTIVE MOVEMENT METAPHORS 
i. I am submerged in circling ego (117) 
ii. I am spinning in a temporary vacuum (36) 
iii. look at the hell I am wallowing in (154)  
In Example 3 there is some motion in each case, a circular motion in fact. However, in terms 
the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor again, these can be interpreted as examples of unproductive 
movement. The circular motion described in these examples does not progress forwards, but 
remains in stationary. The circular movement in these examples (an additional linguistic 
manifestation from elsewhere in the Smith Journal is whirlpool), can be compared to a ‘vicious 
cycle’ – it is fast, circular movement outside the person’s control. It also carries the implication 
of being difficult to get out of. In addition, in Example 3iii (as in whirlpool), there is an 
entailment of downward motion. In iii this is due to the presence of hell which combines with 
the idea of movement to create a more comprehensive sense of the mental state. McMullen 
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and Conway (2002) among others have pointed out the connection between DOWNWARD 
MOVEMENT metaphors and depression in particular, but circularity has not been discussed 
extensively.   
The final group of metaphors that I would like to include here I will discuss in a slightly 
different way to the previous ones. Example 4 includes references to actions that involve 
movement: escape, withdraw and retreat are of particular interest at this point. These 
expressions themselves entail movement away from something unpleasant – a struggle for 
example and they could also be interpreted as examples of movement backwards in the sense 
of LIFE IS A JOURNEY. 
EXAMPLE 4 METAPHORS OF MOVEMENT 'IN THE WRONG DIRECTION' 
i. I want to kill myself, to escape from responsibility, to crawl back abjectly into the 
womb. I do not know who I am, where I am going — and I am the one who has to 
decide the answers to these hideous questions. I long for a noble escape from 
freedom (154) 
ii. begging for sleep, withdrawing into the dark, warm, fetid escape from action (154) 
iii. Perverse desire to retreat into not caring. (July 14) 
However, in addition to the metaphorical expressions, in these examples I have highlighted the 
‘origins’ and ‘destinations’ of the relevant movements. Escape is away from responsibility, 
freedom and action, while withdraw and retreat is into escape and not caring. There seems to 
be an interesting pattern emerging from these examples, so the relevant key words were 
explored in the whole of the Smith Journal, using Wmatrix (Rayson, 2009). Concordance 1 and 
Concordance 2 below, show all occurrences of the words escape and retreat in the Smith 
Journal. 
CONCORDANCE 1 ALL OCCURENCES OF 'ESCAPE' IN THE SMITH JOURNAL 
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CONCORDANCE 2 ALL INSTANCES OF 'RETREAT' IN THE SMITH JOURNAL 
 
What these two concordances show (and what the exploration of other relevant terms such as 
withdraw and crawl back corroborate), is that retreat is always into a different place, e.g. non-
thought, blubbering, numbness, womb, masochistic mental hell, not caring. Escape, on the 
other hand, is always away from somewhere e.g. myself, something, rigid cage of routine, 
action, responsibility, freedom. The interesting thing about these two patterns is that Plath 
seems to want to retreat to places that, most people would agree, should be avoided, while 
she wants to escape from things that most people would consider normal parts of everyday 
life. In this sense there seems to be a conflict between ‘normal’ perceptions and how reality is 
perceived by Plath. 
3. CONFLICTED SELF METAPHORS 
At this stage I would like to turn to metaphors where the idea of conflict is more fully explored 
with examples of metaphors of explicit inner conflict. I shall tentatively use the umbrella term 
conflicted or split self metaphors to denote these examples. There are instances in the Journal 
where Plath tends to write about different selves within her. She seems to separate out 
various parts of her and write about them as if they were independent. This effect does not 
always come about solely through metaphors. For example, in My stubborn unimaginative self 
cannot conceive of him (117) and But my honest self revolted at this, hated me for doing this 
(155), self is potentially used metonymically (as it refers only to a part of the whole)iv. 
However, the sense of split is achieved more by the fact that a part of the self is being 
contrasted via the adjectives with another part of the self. There is added metaphoricity in that 
the part of the self is also personified in these examples by conceive, revolted and hated. 
Finding examples of such references to a split self using corpus methods is not difficult. The 
best indicator or key word is self. In fact, a search for precisely that lexical item produced 20 
concordance lines (Concordance 3) of which 8 were instances of the metonymical use of self. 
The frequency (8/20) suggests that this is a very common way of indicating a distinction 
between selves. 
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CONCORDANCE 3 ALL INSATNCES OF 'SELF' IN THE SMITH JOURNAL 
 
Split selves have been discussed in detail by, most notably, Emmott (2002), but also by Lakoff 
(1996). While I will refer to these authors, my notion of split selves needs to be understood as 
a wider umbrella term. Additionally, here I will mainly be discussing more explicitly 
metaphorical examples.  
As these metaphors deal with the idea of ‘self’, I find it useful to work with a definition of sorts 
to specify the ways in which a self can split. Ramachandran (2003) proposes that the self 
should be understood as consisting of four interconnected characteristics: continuity of time (a 
sense of past, present and future), unity or coherence (sense of completeness), embodiment 
or ownership, and agency (Ramachandran, 2003). Based on this definition, a ‘split’ in the self 
can occur at least at the first three levels (also see Emmott, 2002v).  
In terms of continuity, there can be a split between the selves at a Time A and Time B. Because 
people inevitably change over time, the fact that someone feels like a different person (in the 
everyday sense) at the present from ten years earlier does not automatically constitute a split 
in the sense that I am using the term. What I would consider a split in the self are cases where 
the old self and the new self are not reconcilable. In the same way, there can be a split in 
terms of unity when two irreconcilable or very clearly distinguishable parts or even complete 
selves are present at the same point in time. The irreconcilability can be manifested in overt 
conflict or disagreement between the various selves or self parts. Another common form of 
split is that between the mind and body, which falls under embodiment. A mild or temporary 
discrepancy between the mind and the body is quite a common experience (the body is tired, 
but the mind is alert for example), but a split occurs when either of the components develops 
a will or agency of its own. This is also the case if the split occurs not between the mind and 
the body, but between two body parts for example. A split of both embodiment and unity 
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could occur in the case of what Barnden (1997b) calls MIND PARTS AS PERSONS metaphors. ‘Under 
this metaphor a person’s mind is viewed as having “parts” that are themselves people – or at 
least complete minds – having their own thoughts, hopes, emotions, and so forth. [...] 
Different inner persons can have conflicting mental states, or a mental state held by one can 
be failed to be held by another’ (Barden, 1997b:4). 
The main examples of split self in the Smith Journal are splits in unity and/or embodiment and 
account for about 10% of the metaphors of mental states examined in the manual intensive 
analysis. Example 5 is a collection of these types of metaphors (note that some elements of 
Example 5iii were discussed above). 
EXAMPLE 5 SPLIT SELF METAPHORS 
i. to feel his mind soaring, reaching, and mine caged, crying impotent, self-reviling an 
imposter (154) 
ii. it was good to let go let the tight mask fall off, and the bewildered, chaotic fragments 
pour out (155 
iii. My world falls apart crumbles. "The center does not hold." There is no integrating 
force (154) 
There is a strong sense of conflict in Example 5i. Firstly, the example suggests a split of 
embodiment, in the sense that the mind is caged (as discussed above) separately from the 
body. Secondly, the mind is endowed with a personality of its own, suggesting a split in unity. 
This is similar to Barnden’s (1997a) MIND PARTS AS PERSONS OR OTHER ANIMATE BEINGS metaphor, 
with the exception that the whole mind is conceptualized as a separate person. There is not 
only conflict (crying, self-reviling) between the selves in Example 5i, but also a sense of 
desperation. This is evoked by impotent, which can be seen as another nested metaphor 
(belonging both to the source domain of physical illness and lack of movement). Additionally, 
imposter (aside from being another form of personification) has connotations of subversion 
and intentional deceit. 
Lines ii and iii in Example 5 are perhaps more marginal cases of the documented split self 
metaphors. In fact they could also be called ‘fragmentation’ or ‘coming apart’ metaphors – 
there is clear reference to the falling apart, or disintegration of either the self or the 
surroundings. However, the disintegration refers to the sense of unity – of being one coherent 
being. In these examples the sense of unity disappears, creating another form of the split self 
metaphor. What is particularly interesting about these examples, is that there is an equal and 
opposite pattern of metaphors of positive mental states. Positive mental states are sometimes 
referred to as self-integrality or as being integrated. Although the fragmentation metaphor is 
not particularly well documented in the psychology literature, Goatly et al. (2002-2005) do 
include examples of the MENTAL DISTURBANCE IS DIVISION/INCOMPLETENESS metaphor in his 
Metalude databank. It seems that these examples fall into that category. In addition, mask in 
Example 5ii is a more explicitly metaphorical manifestation of the self metaphors discussed by 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999). It could be seen as a distinction between an inner and an outer self 
(or a private and public self). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I have discussed some of the metaphorical expressions of mental states that are 
present in the Smith Journal of Sylvia Plath. I briefly mentioned the systematic metaphors such 
as MENTAL STATES ARE PHYSICAL STATES and NEGATIVE MENTAL STATE ARE OPPONENTS, but I mainly 
focused on metaphors of MOTION and SPLIT SELF. Metaphors of MOTION accounted for 21% of 
metaphors of mental states in the Smith Journal and had three main types: lack of motion, 
unproductive motion, and motion in the ‘wrong’ direction. SPLIT SELF metaphors were about 
half as frequent in the Smith Journal but were interesting for their expression of inner conflict. 
I also briefly touched upon the way in which metaphorical expressions can convey a sense of 
intensity or valency. It was argued that a sense of intensity (of the mental state) in the Smith 
Journal can also be created by textual patterning (mainly repetition), as well as interaction 
with literal and hyperbolic references. Other aspects of mental states are most often conveyed 
through the interaction of various source domains in textual clusters and through the 
(sometimes multiple) entailments of vehicle terms. In this process, the usefulness of some 
corpus methods was also commented on.  
In terms of a real life application, these results could be useful in the context of psychotherapy. 
McMullen and Conway (2002) recommend that therapists focus more closely on the types of 
metaphors that their patients use and their potential implications. Focusing on the metaphors 
discussed in the present paper then, one could perhaps address the sense of ‘being stuck’ that 
is evident in the motion metaphors by helping patients recognize patterns of language (and 
thought), develop different patterns of conceptualization and ‘move beyond’ unproductive 
patterns. Similarly, where metaphors of split selves persist, therapy could be targeted at 
reintegrating or at least reconciling the multiple selves. Future research should focus on 
describing the patterns of different mental states (perhaps assessed through psychological 
tests) in order to create a typology of metaphors associated with them. These could then have 
wider application in psychotherapy. 
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NOTES 
                                                          
i I have included ‘the self’ in this specification as people’s view of themselves is connected to 
their mental state. As such, descriptions of the self can be indicative of mental states. 
ii Although some of the pronouns in these examples, are second person pronouns, they do still 
refer to Sylvia Plath, making the metaphors expressions of her mental state. The change in 
pronoun use is explained by the fact that some of the entries in the Smith Journal were written 
using you to designate Plath. 
iii Although ‘emotion’ is a narrower concept than ‘mental state’ for the purposes of the 
comparison of their metaphors the two will be treated as synonymous. 
iv It should be noted that very similar examples have been analyzed as metaphorical by Lakoff 
(1996) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999). They are supposedly common and the various ‘selves’ 
are associated with different social or professional roles for example (e.g. someone can be a 
mother as well as a daughter; someone can speak professionally), or can consist of the 
distinction between a public and a private persona.  
v Although Emmott (2002) discusses similar types of split selves, it should be noted that my 
own definition is somewhat different from (and broader than) Emmott’s. For Emmott, “cases 
of a character or real life individual being divided and/or duplicated in any way” (2002:154) are 
considered split selves. My own understanding includes all of these as well, but additionally 
includes a fragmentation of identity. 
 
